British Amphibious Operations of the First World War

British Amphibious Operations of the First World War offers a new perspective on Britain’s experience of joint land–sea warfare during the Great War, moving beyond the familiar narrative of failure at Gallipoli.

While Gallipoli has long been viewed as the defining example of amphibious misjudgment, Joseph Moretz shows that Britain’s experience was both broader and more complex. Through detailed studies of three campaigns – Tanga in German East Africa, Mesopotamia, and the Dardanelles–Gallipoli – he evaluates the state of British amphibious warfare on the eve of the war and the operational lessons that were absorbed, ignored, or misunderstood.

The analysis reveals early successes, such as the near-flawless amphibious entry in Mesopotamia, and contrasts them with the difficulties that followed when inadequate logistics met overambitious aims. The book also revisits the Dardanelles campaign, reassessing its operational and strategic outcomes, and considering its enduring impact on British military thinking.

Drawing on extensive research and military insight, Moretz provides a balanced, thought-provoking examination of how inter-service coordination, leadership, and geography shaped Britain’s wartime performance in amphibious operations.

About the Author

Joseph Moretz is an independent historian specialising in the modern Royal Navy and British Army. A graduate of the U.S. Naval War College, he holds both an M.A. and Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College London. He has written extensively on naval and military history, and previously served as a civilian analyst for the U.S. Navy and Department of Defence. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, he is also a member of the Navy Records Society, Army Records Society, and British Commission for Military History.